Article: Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement

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Article: Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement

Date Published: 26 October 2022
Author(s): Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard
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Abstract

This paper by Chris Ranalli and Thirza Lagewaard was published in Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, issue 12 in October 2022.

Abstract
Some disagreements concern our most fundamental beliefs, principles, values, or worldviews, such as those about the existence of God, society and politics, or the trustworthiness of science. These are ‘deep disagreements’. But what exactly are deep disagreements? This paper critically overviews theories of deep disagreement. It does three things. First, it explains the differences between deep and other kinds of disagreement, including peer, persistent, and widespread disagreement. Second, it critically overviews two mainstream theories of deep disagreement, the Wittgensteinian account and the Fundamental Epistemic Principle account, before introducing a Hybrid account. Finally, it explores the notion that deep disagreements can be deeper than others.

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Chris Ranalli Thirza J. Lagewaard

This project is funded by:

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
European Research Council
European Union